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MYER S. McDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
How New Is the New International Legal
Order?
Louis B. SOHN*
In September 1990, in the midst of the Gulf crisis, President Bush, in
an address to a joint session of both houses of Congress, espoused a new
goal for the foreign policy of the United States. He expressed the hope
that out of these troubled times a new objective can emerge - "a new
world order," a new era "freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the
pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, . . . a world
where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle."'
A few weeks later, appearing before the United Nations General As-
sembly, President Bush called for a "new partnership of nations" that
would be based "on consultation, cooperation, and collective action....
united by principle and the rule of law supported by an equitable sharing
of both costs and commitment."' Its goals would be "to increase democ-
racy, increase prosperity, increase peace, and reduce arms."' He was glad
to see that the United Nations started fulfilling its promise as the world's
"parliament of peace," and that it has become "the place to build inter-
national support and consensus" for meeting not only the challenge of
aggression but also other challenges, such as threats to the environment,
debt burden, terrorism, drug trafficking, and refugees.' "Calls for democ-
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racy and human rights," he said, "encourage our hopes for a more stable,
more prosperous world."5
This vision of a new world rising from the ashes of a war is an old
one. Writing more than a hundred years ago, the eminent British interna-
tional lawyer William Edward Hall pointed out that over the last couple
of centuries, at the close of each fifty years, international law has occu-
pied a more solid position than that which it occupied at the beginning of
the period. While he expected that great wars would still occur, unscrupu-
lously waged, he also foresaw that after each such war the world would do
penance "by putting itself under straighter obligations than those which
it before acknowledged."' This happened in the lifetime of some of us,
first after World War I when the League of Nations was created "to pro-
mote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and se-
curity, . . .by the firm establishment of the understandings of interna-
tional law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations
in the dealings of organized peoples with one another."7
Again, after World War II, in the 1945 Charter of the United Na-
tions, the Governments of the United Nations, acting on behalf of their
peoples, agreed "to maintain international peace and security" through
"effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace," to "settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a man-
ner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endan-
gered," to cooperate "in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms," as well as "to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom," and "to establish condi-
tions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained."8
Coming closer to our times, in 1988, in the last year of the Reagan
Administration, the Department of State published a booklet setting out
in considerable detail the interests and objectives of American Foreign
Policy.' It might be useful to quote here the list of these interests and
objectives; according to the booklet, the United States was seeking to:
1. Uphold the principles of freedom, the rule of law, and observance of
fundamental human rights;
2. Promote our domestic prosperity;
5. Id.
6. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW vii, iX-X, (4th ed. 1895).
7. See League of Nations Covenant, in Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Part I. See
also other Peace Treaties signed in 1919 and 1920, reprinted in HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 1 (1931).
8. U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1 and 2 [cited in order slightly different than the one
used in the Charter].
9. Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Policy, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Mar. 1988, at 1.
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3. Protect the security of our nation and its institutions, as well as
those of our allies and friends;
4. Contribute to a safer world by reaching equitable and verifiable
arms reductions agreements with the Soviet Union;
5. Assist the economic development of poorer nations; and
6. Act in a manner consistent with our humanitarian instincts.
Apart from domestic goals affecting the American ability to pursue
these foreign goals, the statement emphasized the global goals of "pros-
perity, security and democratic change." In particular, it supported: (a)
"a global trend of democratic institution-building" that requires a "bal-
anced approach to the defense of human rights and fundamental free-
doms" as well as easing "the plight of millions suffering from want, vio-
lence, and oppression throughout the world;" (b) "the global trend toward
greater confidence in free market-oriented solutions to the problems of
economic growth, and the movement everywhere in the world ... to de-
centralize, deregulate, and denationalize;" (c) the continuance of efforts
"to achieve equitable, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union that would enhance strategic stability;" and (d) the
exploitation of the "possibilities for the United Nations and increasingly
significant country groupings to deal with regional concerns and foster
global economic development. 0
Some of these objectives were stated in a tentative fashion, and the
comprehensive comments on them in the later parts of the pamphlet
show still the "Cold War" mentality and only minimal interest in bring-
ing the United Nations into the picture. The situation changed drastically
during the Bush Administration, when several impossible dreams sud-
denly were realized - the liberation of Eastern Europe, the unification of
Germany, the freeing of the Baltic States, the revolutionary changes in
the Soviet Union, the collapse of communist ideology, and the return of
the United Nations to the role it was designed to play. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the Gulf crisis resulted in another chance to fulfill
Professor Hall's prophecy. A new world order is in the making, and there
is again the hope that the rule of law will supplant the rule of the jungle,
that the partnership of nations, hoped for at San Francisco in 1945, will
actually be established, based on the one hand on "consultation, coopera-
tion and collective action," and, on the other hand, increased democracy,
prosperity through a free market, reduced arms, and a United Nations
enabled to both maintain peace and protect human rights.
To assess these developments, in May 1991, the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy and the United Nations Association of the United
States of America, with the assistance of the Hitachi Foundation, organ-
ized a Roundtable given the task of "Defining a New World Order" more
precisely. The discussion was chaired by Elliot Richardson and Brian Ur-
10. Id. at 1, 4, and 9.
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quhart, and was based on a thoughtful paper by Professor Alan K. Hen-
rikson, who was also in charge of preparing the conference report. 1 I was
privileged to participate in this conference. Other participants included
experts not only from the United States but also from Africa, Asia, Latin
America, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe, as well as experts exper-
ienced in international organizations and United Nations activities. They
agreed on the need to design a more efficient and more effective interna-
tional system, based on improved international cooperation. The New
World Order has to respond to the new challenges brought by "the pro-
cess of democratization and liberalization," which in turn is connected
with the new emphasis on "individual rights, economic freedoms, and po-
litical liberty." In addition, "the increased globalization of economic and
political issues leads to greater interdependence among states." The
breakup of empires and the demands for self-determination in new areas
of the world result at the same time in the revival of national, ethnic, and
religious rivalries that collide with the trend toward interdependence.
Some participants warned that there might develop a tendency for a few
strong nations to use strong measures to impose cooperation, but most
thought that it will be generally recognized that the new international
system would fail if the views of the developing world, which represents
four-fifths of the world's population, are not respected. All nations must
feel that the decisions of common international institutions do in fact
promote both peace and justice, and do it even-handedly; only such deci-
sions will command general acceptance.'"
In light of this discussion and the many articles and statements that
have appeared in newspapers and learned periodicals, I would like to con-
centrate the remainder of my own statement on a more limited area, the
International Legal Order or the World Rule of Law, a concept often
mentioned but seldom discussed in depth. This concept has two main in-
gredients: the rule of law in relations between states; and the rule of law
in relations between states and individuals, especially the need to protect
individuals against the abuse of power by state authorities.
The current emphasis on self-determination, democracy, and human
rights destroys to some extent this dichotomy. The international commu-
nity's interest in these issues strikes at the roots of traditional concepts of
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The new concept of the
World Rule of Law, however, does not allow some states to act as self-
appointed guardians of World Order; instead it transfers the duty to
11. See Alan K. Henrikson, Defining a New World Order: A Discussion Paper (May
1991), and Defining a New World Order: The Conference Report [hereinafter Conference
Report]. Professor Henrikson, in a prophetic fashion, participated a few years ago in the
Negotiating World Order Project of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and edited
a volume of essays written by "international negotiators" (the diplomatic artisans), and by
"world order builders" (the international architects). NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE AR-
TISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY (Alan K. Henrikson ed. 1986).
12. Conference Report, supra note 11, at 6-8.
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monitor compliance with its basic concepts from individual states to in-
ternational institutions, both global and regional. As the International
Court of Justice pointed out in the Corfu Channel Case, the alleged right
of intervention was a "manifestation of a policy of force," has given rise
to most serious abuses, and, being reserved to the most powerful, "might
easily lead to perverting the administration of justice itself."" Such abuse
of power can be avoided only under a system in which an international
institution would decide whether an intervention is necessary, who should
be authorized to intervene, and how the intervention will be monitored.
To ensure that all these decisions are made properly, and that due pro-
cess, both as to substance and procedure, is observed, a supervisory role
may be assigned to the International Court of Justice, acting though advi-
sory opinions which would be accepted in advance as binding.-" The fol-
lowing example may illustrate how this system might work.
It is generally accepted that one of the objectives of the World Rule
of Law is to protect small and weak states against their more powerful
neighbors, not only against direct aggression, as in the case of Kuwait,
but even against threats to the peace and breaches of the peace, and
other acts below the threshold of aggression which affect a small state's
security, independence or free choice of government.
In several recent instances, one of the major powers has intervened
either in a civil war in favor of the party with similar ideology, on human-
itarian grounds because of a gross violation of human rights, or in order
to restore a constitutional government replaced by a military junta. Now
that law has been recognized as a social science, a lawyer may perhaps be
allowed to simplify the facts of a case to allow more thorough analysis of
the interaction among the principal factors. A slightly revised Nicaraguan
case may serve as a good example, provided it is restricted to the issue of
the support to the contras, thus avoiding the complications caused by the
dispute over the facts of prior "attack" of Nicaragua on El Salvador, over
the scope of its intervention in El Salvador's civil war, and over the exis-
tence of a proper justification for the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense. While these parts of the International Court's decision have
been severely criticized, the rules enunciated by the Court with respect to
the right to intervene in a civil war have been generally accepted.
Assuming these more limited facts, the International Court of Justice
has made clear that an intervention by a state in a civil war in another
state even through indirect means such as organizing, or encouraging the
13. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 34-35.
14. For example, in the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, Feb. 14, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 16, Article VII, Section
30 provides that if a difference relating to the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion should arise between the United Nations and a Member State, "a request shall be made
[to the International Court of Justice] for an advisory opinion on any legal question in-
volved," and that the opinion given by the Court "shall be accepted as decisive by the
parties."
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organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries,
for incursion into the territory of another state, may be considered as a
armed attack, "if such an incursion because of its scale and effects, would
have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier
incident had it been carried out by regular forces."'16 While the Court did
not consider "assistance to rebels in the form of provision of weapons or
logistical or other support" as an armed attack, it pointed out that such
assistance may be regarded as "a threat or use of force" or as "interven-
tion in the internal or external affairs of other States."' 6 In a later part of
the case, the Court took a broad view of the principle of non-intervention,
which it considered as "part and parcel of customary international law,"
although it was not spelled out in the Charter of the United Nations. 7
The Court refused, in particular, to permit a State "to intervene, directly
or indirectly, with or without armed force," in the affairs of another
State, "in support of an internal opposition .. .whose cause appeared
particularly worthy by reason of the political or moral values with which
it was identified."'" Only some economic measures are permissible in that
case, such as cessation of economic aid, reduction of commodity quotas,
or a trade embargo.1"
This proscription of the use of force or intervention by any State in
situations where another State grossly violates international law - for
instance, by engaging in genocidal extermination of a part of its popula-
tion because of ethnic differences - should not deprive the people con-
cerned of help against the aggressor. For instance, a World Rule of Law
approach might permit the United Nations Security Council: (a) to de-
clare that such gross violations of an important rule of international law
constitute a threat to the peace; and (b) to authorize a State or a group of
States to take such measures as may be necessary, including the use of
force, to stop these violations. To prevent any abuse of this right of au-
thorized intervention, the State against which the action is being author-
ized should be allowed to petition the General Assembly to ask for an
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice whether the cir-
cumstances of the case justified such authorization. A special legal com-
mittee of the Assembly might be authorized to grant such a request, and
15. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103, $ 195 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. The Court relied
in this case, to some extent, on the definition of aggression approved by the General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 29 G.A.O.P. Supp. No. 31(A/9631), at 143. That resolution was
adopted by consensus on December 14, 1974, after seven years of negotiations.
16. Nicaragua Case, supra note 15, at 104, T 195. See also id. at 119, 1 230, and at 126-
27, 1 247. Two dissenting judges were willing to consider even such activities as an armed
attack. See id. at 331-47, 17 154-71 (Judge Schwebel) and at 543 (Judge Jennings).
17. Id. at 106, T 202.
18. Id. at 108, 1 206.
19. Id. at 125-26, 11 244-45. For a more detailed discussion of these aspects of the case,
see Louis B. Sohn, The International Court of Justice and the Scope of the Right of Self-
Defense and the Duty of Non-Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TIME OF PERPLEXITY
869 (Yoram Dinstein ed. 1989).
VOL. 20:2
1992 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 211
might be obliged to do it in any case where the complaint is not frivolous.
The Court would be obliged to give this request priority and render
promptly its opinion whether the intervention was justified. If not, the
Security Council would be obliged to terminate the intervention. On the
other hand, the approval of the intervention by the Court would rally the
world public opinion in support of the Council's action.
This is just one example of how the Would Rule of Law approach
would help in a situation that, unfortunately, still occurs quite often. It
illustrates how, step by step, the United Nations may develop new powers
able, to paraphrase the words of President Bush, to increase peace, to
increase democracy, and to bring us closer to a more stable, more pros-
perous world.

